Unitary Theory of Stock Ownership Fink v. Commissioner by Stamm, Janis
The University of Akron
IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Tax Journal Akron Law Journals
1988
Unitary Theory of Stock Ownership Fink v.
Commissioner
Janis Stamm
Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal
Part of the Tax Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Tax Journal by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stamm, Janis (1988) "Unitary Theory of Stock Ownership Fink v. Commissioner," Akron Tax Journal: Vol. 5 ,
Article 15.
Available at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol5/iss1/15
UNITARY THEORY OF STOCK OWNERSHIP
FINK v. COMMISSIONER
In Commissioner v. Fink,' the Supreme Court held that a dominant share-
holder who voluntarily surrenders a portion of his shares to the corporation, while
retaining control, does not sustain an immediate loss deductible for income tax
purposes. Such a surrender of stock must be treated as a contribution to capital,
the basis of the surrendered shares being reallocated to the remaining shares held
and loss or gain recognized only when the shareholder disposes of the remain-
ing shares.2
Stock surrenders generally occur in the context of a failing corporation. The
dominant shareholder hopes, by surrendering stock, to assist the corporation in
attracting new capital, motivating key employees, or improving the balance sheet
by reducing the number of shares outstanding Peter and Karla Fink sought just
such a result in 1976 and 1977 when they surrendered shares in Travco, their finan-
cially troubled Michigan manufacturer of motor homes. The Finks, in a non-pro-
rata surrender,4 reduced their holding in the company from 72.5 % to 68.5 % in
an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to attract new capital. They received no com-
pensation for the surrendered shares. Based on a long line of court cases,5 the Finks
took ordinary loss deductions equal to their basis in the surrendered shares.
The issue presented in Fink appeared to be well-settled. The basis of the sur-
rendered stock, since there was no "sale or exchange" requiring capital asset treat-
ment under Internal Revenue Code Section 1222,6 was treated as an ordinary loss
pursuant to Code Section 165.7 Then, in 1977, the Internal Revenue Service
1107 S. Ct. 2729 (1987), rev'g 789 F.2d427 (6th Cir. 1986), rev'g 53T.C.M. (P-H) 84,418 (T.C. 1984).
2Fink, 107 S. Ct. at 2734.
3 The Tax Court in Downer v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 86 (1967), considered the treatment of a shareholder's
uncompensated stock transfers to a third party to benefit the corporation, and determined that they also resulted
in an immediate loss. Two years later Congress added I.R.C. § 83, which, together with the Regulations (par-
ticularly Treas. Reg. § 1.83-6(d)), require the transfer of stock to third persons to be treated as a contribu-
tion to capital. The Regulations were upheld in Tilford v. Commissioner, 705 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1983) cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983).
4 Where surrender of shares is on a pro rata basis, no taxable event occurs as a proportional surrender leaves
every shareholder with the same respective interest in the corporation..
5 Estate of Foster v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 930 (1947); Miller v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 292 (1947); Budd
International Corp. v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 737 (1941), rev'don other grounds, 143 F2d 784 (3rd Cir.
1944). In Smith v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 622 (1976), rev'd sub nom., Schleppy v. Commissioner, 601 F. 2d
196 (5th Cir. 1979), the Fifth Circuit reversed the Tax Court primarily because a non pro rata surrender of
only 2 % interest in the controlled corporation was too insignificant to trigger a loss.
6As amended by The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 86), Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 301 and 311, 100 Stat. 2216,
2219 (1986).
7 Although the Tax Reform Act of 1986 eliminated the tax rate differential between ordinary and chpital trans-
actions, the difference between an ordinary loss and a capital loss remains important as individuals are per-
mitted to deduct only $3,000 of capital losses against ordinary income in each year, whereas all ordinary losses
may generally be deducted.
7As amended by TRA 86, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 905(a) and 1004(a), 100 Stat. 2385, 2388 (1986).
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withdrew its acquiescence to such treatment 8 and took the issue into the Tax Court
in Fink, and in Frantz v. Commissioner.9
In the Frantz decision, the Tax Court first reviewed its long history of approv-
ing ordinary loss treatment.'0 The court then abandoned its earlier adoption of
the "fragmentary" theory of stock ownership and adopted the "unitary" theory."
The fragmentary theory of stock ownership views each share of stock as a separate
asset, therefore a sale of any share of stock is a closed transaction giving rise to
immediate tax consequences. The unitary theory of stock ownership views a
shareholder's interest in a corporation as a unit. Transactions of partial stock
holdings remain open transactions until the shareholder's entire interest is trans-
ferred.12 The shareholder is viewed as surrendering stock only to benefit the shares
of stock retained.
This unitary view permits the court to find that partial surrender is more akin
to a contribution to capital than a disposition of a property interest. A partial sur-
render is, under this view, an open nontaxable transaction with the basis of sur-
rendered shares reallocated to increase the basis of retained shares. The transaction
becomes a closed, taxable event only on final disposition of all corporate holdings.
In an eight-to-one decision the Supreme Court in Fink'3 sided with the Com-
missioner, the Tax Court and the Second Circuit. The decision was grounded on
three points. First the Court viewed the surrender of stock as essentially similar
to a shareholder's forgiveness of debt owed to him by the corporation. 4 Debt
forgiveness is treated as a capital contribution. The Court recognized, but was
not swayed, by the Finks' arguments that a surrender of stock is not recorded as
a capital contribution for accounting purposes and results in a reduction of the
surrendering shareholder's proportionate interest in the corporation. t5
'The I.R.S. acquiesced in the cases of Miller, 45 B.T.A. 292 andBudd, 45 B.T.A. 737, atRev. Rul. 52-1 1299,
1942-2 C.B. 3 and 13. Acquiescence was withdrawn in 1977, after the Fink transactions, Rev. Rul. at 1977-
1 C.B. 2.. While the I.R.S. publicly acquiesced to these decisions, it sometimes took a contrary position in
litigation and Revenue Rulings. See footnote 3 of the Supreme Court's decision in Fink, 107 S. Ct. at 2731.
983 T.C. 162(1984), affd. 784 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3262 (1986). In Frantz, the
Second Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision, but limited the Tax Court holding. Frantz, 784 F.2d at
126. However, the court stressed that it was not ruling on whether a shareholder surrendering a more
substantial equity interest might sustain an immediate loss. Id. In Fink, the Tax Court specifically refused
to abandon the historical fragmentary view of stock ownership. Fink, 53 T.C.M. (P-H) §§84,418. The U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari to settle the dispute between the circuits. Fink, 107 S. Ct. 454 (1986).
10The Tax Court's decision in Frantz, 83 T.C. 162, was a regular decision issued by the Court with four judges
dissenting. The decision in Fink was issued by the court on the same day in a Memorandum Decision which
referred to the reasoning in Frantz. Fink, 53 T.C.M. (P-H) § 84,418.
1 'Frantz, 83 T.C. at 174.
1 'For further discussion of the unitary and fragmentary theory of stock ownership, see "Frantz or Fink: Unitary
or Fractional View of Non-Prorata Stock Surrenders;' 48 U. Pitt. L. Rev., 905 (1987).
3 Fink, 107 S. Ct. 2729 (Syllabus). Justice Stevens dissented from the majority decision on the basis that
the law had been long-settled when the Fink transactions occurred. Any change of established precedent
should be undertaken by Congress and not the courts. Id. at 2736 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
14 /d. at 2732.
5Id. at 2734.
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UNITARY THEORY OF STOCK OWNERSHIP
It is sufficient, as the Court found in its second analytical premise, that the
Finks were motivated by a desire to enhance the value of their remaining shares
of stock.16 The Court adopted the unitary theory of stock ownership in determining
that the motive of enhancing the value of stock holdings retained, causes the sur-
render of a partial interest to be an inappropriate time to recognize gain or loss. 17
The Finks must await final disposition of their corporate interest to determine
ultimate gain or loss. 8
Finally, the Court commented that the immediate recognition of ordinary loss
to a surrendering shareholder could result in a convenient method for shareholders
in failing corporations to convert capital to ordinary losses. 19
The decision in Fink will not end litigation in the area. The Supreme Court
left open the question of whether non-pro-rata surrenders by a nondominate
shareholder or surrenders reducing a controlling shareholder's position to non-
controlling would result in immediate, ordinary loss.20
The unitary theory of stock ownership will spawn new legal issues. For ex-
ample, will the Internal Revenue Service be content to follow the unitary theory
when a dominant shareholder sells a block of stock for a profit; or, to what ex-
tent will the unitary view be followed in publically traded corporations. For that
matter, what level of stock ownership is required to be "dominant" or "con-
trolling" in a publically traded corporation.' There are estate tax implications
in the area of corporate asset freezes and gifting programs utilizing shares of stock.
If a donor gifts corporate stock but retains control has there been, under the uni-
tary theory, a completed gift or has there been a retention of some lifetime interest.
A theory, such as unitary stock ownership, approved by the Supreme Court
and imposed on a complex tax system will have a long and litigated life.
JANIS STAMM
161d. at 2732.
17The Court found precedent in I.R.C. §§ 83 and 302 for adoption of the unitary view of stock ownership.
Id. at 2735.
181d.
19The Sixth Circuit in Fink, 789 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1986), also noted the abuse potential, but asserted that
the tax law provided other means - substance over form, sham transaction, step transaction, and the business
purpose rule - to avoid abuse. Id. at 432.
20 Justice White wrote a concurring opinion in Fink, in which he extended the majority's opinion to cover a
surrender of stock which did cause loss of control by the surrendering shareholder. Fink, 107 S.Ct. at 2735
(White, J., concurring).
21The Supreme Court, in footnote 15, implies that while "loss of control" in the instant case means less than
50 percent ownership, such definition might not apply to a publicly traded company where control may exist
with less than majority ownership, Id.
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